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Abstract 
 We present for the first time in the literature a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of 
the “political safeguards of federalism.”  We also test the popular theory that 
congressional control of state authority to tax maximizes national welfare.  Both 
analyses rely on a hand-collected data set of every federal statute to date affecting state 
power to tax.   
 Overall, our data suggest that federal decisions to curtail state autonomy are strongly 
influenced by congressional self-interest.  Conditional on enactment, statutes affecting 
state taxing power are more likely to reduce state authority when a concentrated special 
interest group stands to benefit, and also when the reduction would reduce competition 
between states and Congress.   
 While this outcome certainly does not resolve the debate over judicial enforcement 
of federalism, it should significantly advance that debate.  At a minimum, we show that 
state power to influence Congress is not absolute, and state influence in fact fails under 
conditions similar to those in which critics of the safeguards theory have predicted that 
state influence would fail.  Additionally, we argue that our results cast significant doubt 
on recent calls to give control of state taxing authority solely to Congress.  
 
JEL Codes: H11, H77, K34  
  
Introduction  
 Theories of the “political safeguards” of U.S. federalism have frequently been aired but 
seldom tested.  The basic claim, beginning with Wechsler (1954), is that state influence is 
sufficient to preserve state autonomy from federal encroachments.  For example, Kramer (2000) 
argues that the dependence of federal officials on state party support gives state officials 
bargaining leverage to fend off incursions.  (See also Choper 1980, La Pierre 1985, Rubin & 
Feeley 1994, Dana 1995).  Critics counter that state autonomy as a whole is a public good, such 
that officials may have little incentive to exercise whatever influence they hold, and so only 
courts can adequately ensure that States in the long run will retain independence from federal 
control.  (Derthick 1986, Baker & Young 2002, McGinnis & Somin 2004).1  Others accept 
Wechsler’s and Kramer’s claims only partially, arguing that one or more of the branches of 
federal government are more or less apt to respect state autonomy.  (Mendelson 2004, Nzelibe 
2006, Metzger 2008, Sharkey 2008, Pursley 2010). 
 In a parallel debate, commentators also disagree over which federal institution should be 
responsible for ensuring a free flow of trade among the States.  In the current U.S. arrangement, 
courts and Congress share power, with Congress holding final say.  Courts fill in interstitially, 
striking down sub-national taxes and regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce.  
Since at least the 1950’s, however, the Court has urged Congress to assume more responsibility 
for reviewing state taxation.  In recent decades the Court has seemed to take steps to force 
Congress to do so.  And prominent scholars have suggested retreat from or wholesale 
abandonment of federal judicial oversight of state taxes.  (Redish & Nugent 1987, Zelinsky 
2002). 
 This Chapter breaks from the existing literature by offering quantitative evidence of how 
Congress has actually used its authority to regulate state taxing power.2  Utilizing a hand-
                                                 
1 For extended discussion of this argument and exploration of the instances in which autonomy would not represent 
a public good, see Galle & Seidenfeld (2008) and Galle (2008).   
2 Several earlier authors examine the evidence on the safeguards hypothesis, but their efforts are purely qualitative, 
generally consisting of the historical background of one or two statutes.  (Lee 1988, Dinan 1997, Hamilton 2001, 
Pickerill 2004, Jones 2004-2005, Resnik 2008, Dinan 2009).  Bowman & Krause (2003:302) lament this state of 
affairs.   Frymer & Yoon (2002) also present qualitative descriptions of the sources of funding for modern political 
parties, which they argue bears on the Kramer hypothesis.  Kam and Mikos (2007) present a quantitative study of 
voter attitudes towards federalism, but do not observe legislative outcomes.  There is a somewhat more extensive 
literature examining the determinants of judicial federalism decisions (e.g., Cross & Tiller 2000, Joondeph 2003, 
Solberg & Lindquist 2006, Collins 2007); our paper can be thought of as a congressional complement to those 
studies.   
 Perhaps the closest to an antecedent quantitative study is Nicholson-Crotty (2008), who reports that 
Congress proposes and enacts fewer pieces of state-autonomy-affecting legislation during election years.  However, 
Nicholson-Crotty does not examine whether legislation is simply shifted from one year to another, so that his 
findings appear to speak only to the timing, rather than the volume, of congressional action.  His results also do little 
to advance the debate, because they can be equally well explained by two competing hypotheses.  On the one hand, 
legislation may decrease because of heightened state influence during crucial periods.  Alternatively, federalism-
type legislation may decrease because of opportunity costs: federalism legislation is less important, and creates 
collected dataset of every federal statute affecting state power to tax since the beginning of the 
republic, we analyze what features, conditional on enactment, characterize congressional 
behavior in this area.  We find that when Congress acts, it tends to reduce rather than expand 
state autonomy, except in the case of state power to tax Indian tribes and tribal resources.  We 
also find that public-choice factors appear to play a significant role in Congress’ decisions: 
narrow, concentrated interests are considerably more likely to win relief from state taxes.  
Surprisingly, this tendency holds true even when there are potentially competing concentrated 
interests, although competition somewhat blunts the efficacy of special interests.   
 These findings arguably weigh against wholesale judicial retreat in both of the areas we 
have mentioned.  On the state autonomy front, we cannot observe the statutes that failed to pass, 
so we cannot draw strong conclusions about whether “political safeguards” may suffice to defeat 
legislation in some or even most instances.  We can, though, confirm empirically the theoretical 
prediction that safeguards are unlikely to be fully effective in the face of strongly opposed 
congressional self-interest.  Prior qualitative observations of federal lawmaking have noted many 
instances where federal authority has appeared to expand, but has not generally inquired whether 
these expansions might serve to enhance state autonomy in the long run.  Our quantitative 
approach allows us to control to some extent for that possibility, and so we think our evidence 
represents a useful advance over the current state of the literature.  
 In this respect we may provide support for current judicial practices, which allow many 
forms of congressional regulation of states but prohibit so-called “unfunded mandates.”  
Likewise, it is a familiar point in the theoretical literature that political economy factors may lead 
to excessive federal legislation if the federal government is not obliged to incur significant costs 
for its decisions.  (La Pierre 1985).  In that situation, enacting or threatening legislation allows 
the federal actor to extract rents, but the costs of the legislation are largely an externality.  Our 
results help to confirm this pattern: when Congress regulates state taxation, it tends to enact 
statutes that pass costs on to others (i.e., reduce state taxing authority) while generating rewards 
for itself (taking credit for enacting a tax cut). 
 On the free-trade front, our evidence again casts some doubt on the wisdom of placing 
full authority in the hands of an unrestrained Congress.  Here our own hypotheses were that 
Congress is a dubious caretaker of state taxing power, for two reasons.  For one, as we have just 
explained---although the literature has never previously recognized it---congressional regulation 
of state taxes has exactly the political-economy structure of an unfunded mandate.  For another, 
                                                                                                                                                             
fewer rents, than others, and so is shifted aside when stakes are higher.  Only the first of these would support the 
political-safeguards hypothesis.    
 We do not mean to suggest that quantitative analysis is necessarily superior to qualitative efforts.  Indeed, 
our quantitative analysis here necessarily must omit important details that may be critical to the outcome of any 
particular piece of attempted legislation.  Our point is only that our contribution differs from the existing literature in 
its wider focus on the commonalities across statutes. 
Congress and the States arguably compete over the same tax base, meaning that any reduction in 
state authority potentially results in less political resistance to congressional revenue-raising.   
 These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and indeed we find support for both.  
Again, we find that opportunities to extract rents from concentrated interest groups correlates 
highly with enactment of federal legislation reducing state taxing power.  As for the second 
hypothesis, we note that Indian tribes and Indian tribal lands are, as the Constitution states, “not 
taxed” by the federal government.  Congress therefore does not compete with the States for the 
opportunity to tax them.  We find, accordingly, that Congress is considerably more permissive in 
its treatment of state efforts to tax the tribes, although we cannot entirely rule out the possibility 
that tribes are simply much worse than anyone else at lobbying Congress.  
 Part I of the Chapter provides a brief overview of the legal context for our investigation.  
Part II reviews the prior literature, and offers several hypotheses about the expected dynamic 
between States and the Congress that regulates them.  Part III explains our methodology, and 
Part IV reports the results.  Part V offers interpretation and caveats. 
I.  Legal Framework for Federal Control of State Taxes and Trade 
 The U.S. Constitution grants overlapping taxing authority to States and the federal 
government.  On the face of the Constitution the States’ power is plenary, aside from bars on 
tariffs on imports and exports, and “dut[ies] of tonnage”.  The text also suggests that the federal 
government’s taxing power is virtually unlimited, although until the enactment of the 16th 
Amendment in 1913 it imposed the burdensome procedural hurdle that all “direct” taxes had to 
be apportioned; “income” taxes now are exempt from that requirement.  One other notable 
federal restriction is that the Constitution suggests that “Indians [are] not taxed” by the national 
government.  
 At the same time, both Courts and Congress have used federal authority to protect free 
trade among the states to modify state taxing power.  Congress, of course, can “regulate 
Commerce . . .among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  It has often used this 
power to alter the scope of state authority.  For example, in ERISA, Congress swept aside, in the 
name of national uniformity, all subnational regulation of employee benefit plans, including any 
efforts to tax such plans or their assets.   
Even when Congress has stood still, the Supreme Court has defended free trade against 
perceived state threats.  Beginning with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion striking down New 
York regulation of steam boats, in Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court has interpreted the constitutional 
grant of the power to regulate “Commerce” as also impliedly requiring a common economic 
market among states free of unnecessary state burdens.  Most lawyers refer to this judicial 
enforcement of free-trade principles as the “dormant” commerce clause, following a coinage of 
one of the early 19th-Century cases.  (Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
245 (1829)).  Congress, however, can authorize any judicially-suspect state action if it so 
chooses.   
Similarly, for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries federal courts presumed that the 
federal government was immune to taxation by the States.  This immunity extended, at its high-
water mark, even to the salaries of contractors working for the federal government.  Even then, 
though, immunity was waivable by Congress.  But this immunity doctrine waned beginning in 
1936, and today extends only to entities that are functionally indistinguishable from the federal 
government itself.   
Much as with federal instrumentalities, Indian tribes have long been held to be 
presumptively beyond the reach of taxation both for the States and also for the federal 
government.  The status of transactions between tribes and outsiders, of outsiders conducting 
business on Indian land, and of individual native Americans, has been less clear and remains a 
source of some legal uncertainty.  For example, the U.S. Treasury ruled in the 1930’s that, while 
tribes themselves were not subject to the federal corporate income tax, individual members were 
responsible for paying their own federal income and social security taxes.  Congress, however, 
may authorize states to tax transactions occurring in Indian territory, apparently including profits 
inuring directly to tribes, and modern doctrine permits states to collect many general taxes, such 
as cigarette excises, within Indian lands even in the absence of express authorization.3   
We exploit the variations among and within these different legal regimes in an effort to 
identify trends in how Congress exercises its power to regulate State taxing authority, as we now 
will detail.   
II.  Hypotheses 
Our basic research question for this study is to examine how Congress has employed its 
authority to curtail states revenues: has it been a bully, a defender of national interests, an 
indifferent by-stander, or a sell-out?  The existing literature offers several competing hypotheses 
about how Congress will behave.  Roughly speaking, they run the gamut from predicting that 
Congress will seek to maximize national welfare to predicting that it will instead maximize the 
rent-seeking opportunities of individual members of Congress.  These hypotheses come from 
different strands of the legal, economic, and political science literatures, and have not been fully 
synthesized before, so that some discussion is warranted.   
The most optimistic assessments come directly from judicial decisions applying the 
dormant commerce clause and the bulk of the legal commentary on them.  Courts and 
commentators alike observe that the fundamental flaws the Constitution was designed to solve 
were that state decisions affecting interstate trade gave rise to externalities, and that coasian 
interstate bargaining was fraught with coordination difficulties.  (E.g., Tribe 1999).  As a 
                                                 
3 For more discussion of this complex area, see Frickey 1990, Taylor 2007, and Jensen 2008. 
nationally-representative body, Congress is supposed to internalize all nationwide costs and 
benefits.   
According to the literature, federal courts, too, can play this internalization role, but the 
modern trend is to prefer Congress.  The judicial role was justified, most famously by Justice 
Jackson, as a necessary supplement to Congress in a large nation whose Constitution was 
designed to make national legislation difficult.  But modern decisions and commentary 
emphasize instead the putatively superior democratic pedigree and fact-finding abilities of 
Congress.  (Hellerstein 1941, Eule 1982, Swain 2003).  Some important voices, including Justice 
Thomas, have called for complete abandonment of the dormant commerce clause and a full 
takeover by Congress.  (Redish & Nugent 1987, Zelinsky 2002; Eule (1982) opposes the 
dormant commerce clause but would retain some role for judges).  
There have been very few skeptics in the other direction.  Shaviro (1992) and Galle 
(2007) observe that Congress is not necessarily a nationally-representative body.  Instead, of 
course, its members serve a regional constituency, and it is only by bargaining and log-rolling 
that its outcomes approximate some national interest.  Basic free-rider theory suggests, then, that 
issues of general importance to the States will not garner any devoted congressional following, 
while issues that disproportionately affect one or a few regions will have strong supporters who 
cannot expect to free ride on the efforts of others.  Voters who are concerned about division of 
power between tiers of government cannot generally punish the national government as a whole 
when it overreaches.  (Bednar 2007).  Thus, the prediction would be that Congress will often 
enact, or at least overlook, measures that allow some states to burden the rest.  (Galle 2007). 
In a related vein, turning from the dormant commerce clause to the broader field of 
federalism theory generally, many commentators point to public-choice factors that would likely 
tend to lead members of Congress to neglect national welfare-maximization in favor of self-
interest.  For example, Zelinsky (1993) and McGinnis and Somin (2004) point out that to the 
extent that political autonomy for lower-tier governments improves long-term national welfare, 
that gain is a public good for the nation as a whole.  We therefore should expect defenders of 
state autonomy to free ride on one another, so that state autonomy tends to lose out to the 
preferences of concentrated interest groups in political struggles.4  Similarly, Mayhew (1974) 
predicts that federal restrictions may be imposed to appease special interests, and Macey (1986) 
predicts that members of Congress will assert exclusive federal power over some policy areas in 
order to monopolize rents from the regulated industries.     
In other instances Congress may share power in order to pass along costs but retain 
credit.  That is the standard explanation for the popularity of so-called “unfunded mandates,” in 
which Congress enacts policies but requires state governments to carry them out.  (Zelinsky 
1993, Garrett 1997).  The costs of implementation, and potentially the political blame for policy 
                                                 
4 For more general assertions of the superiority of the executive in maximizing national welfare, see Olson (1982), 
McGinnis (2001) and Kagan (2001). 
failures, can be passed on to others.  (See Bednar 2007 for a formal model).  Critics argue that 
unfunded mandates are likely welfare-reducing because Congress does not internalize the costs 
of its decisions.  (LaPierre 1985). 5   
It might be argued that internalization is not an important consideration because members 
of Congress are relatively insensitive to cost.  Of course, to the extent that Congress is motivated 
by non-budgetary factors, the importance of budget internalization diminishes (Dana 1995, 
Levinson 2005), but would still be significant on the margin.  Levinson (2005:928-29) goes 
further, arguing that members of Congress are at best only weakly motivated by the size of the 
federal budget, since the effect of any one actor on the budget as a whole is largely an externality 
for individual members.  If so, we would expect that budgetary factors will be more predictive 
for smaller legislative bodies, since in that case the externality is smaller and Coasean bargaining 
over externalities somewhat more straightforward.   
While these observations are now commonplace in the general federalism literature, they 
have not generally been applied to the question of the dormant commerce clause.  Indeed, a 
leading proponent of exclusive congressional control over free trade has also been a significant 
critic of unfunded mandates.  (Compare Zelinsky 1993 with Zelinsky 2002).  Yet a congressional 
decision to prohibit certain state taxes would appear to have the exact political structure of any 
other unfunded mandate: the state loses money, while Congress can take political credit with the 
affected interest group. 
Of course, the claim that Congress does not internalize the costs of imposing mandates on 
states, or of otherwise reducing state authority, assumes that state officials have no way of 
influencing their federal counterparts.  (Adler 1997).  In fact, though, there is a robust tradition in 
the legal literature arguing that state officials have powerful sway, such as through their ability to 
provide get-out-the-vote support during federal elections.  (Kramer 2000).  Alternatively, in the 
modern regulatory state in which many programs are vertically integrated between the States and 
the federal government, states have hold-out power; they can refuse to provide the information 
and on-the-ground enforcement that federal programs depend on.  Or, in the case of federal law 
that is enacted as a condition attached to a federal grant, states can simply refuse to accept the 
conditional funds. 
We have argued elsewhere that the extent of state influence is likely to be contingent on 
institutional arrangements and other factors.  For instance, hold-out power depends on whether 
states in fact have any real leverage: refusal to accept a conditional grant is a more meaningful 
                                                 
5 In addition to curtailing “excess” federal legislation, however that concept might be defined, internalization serves 
another important federalism function by preserving state power to bargain with the federal government.  As Hills 
(1998) explains, when Congress must pay states for their agreement, or must pay for the administrative apparatus to 
enforce its laws in the absence of state cooperation, states gain some hold-up power.  Arguably, this heightened 
bargaining power increases state autonomy, although in instances in which individual hold-outs are an impediment 
to collective action, this power may be counter-productive.  See Galle (2008) and Bulman-Pozen and Gerken (2009) 
for more extensive discussions of this latter point. 
threat if the federal government lacks constitutional authority to enact the grant’s conditions 
outright.  (Galle 2004).  To take another example, some scholars have argued that state-official 
lobbying is not a meaningful constraint on Congress’ ability to curtail state prerogatives because 
of free riding among those officials.  (Derthick 1986, Baker & Young 2002, McGinnis & Somin 
2004.)  Bellia (2006) presents a nice case study of this effect, finding that federal regulation of 
the power of state courts to hear civil suits was facilitated by the fact that the legislation offered 
concentrated benefits for interstate businesses while diminishing the power of most states 
uniformly.  But in some cases state opposition to federal law may be more like a private good to 
the official, such as when there is local interest-group pressure in opposition.  (Levinson 2005, 
Galle 2008).     
Putting together these various political-economy observations, we should expect that 
Congress will be especially apt to reduce state authority when several factors coincide.  If 
members of Congress can extract rents from a concentrated interest group, if Congress faces 
little opportunity cost in enacting legislation, if the states have no hold-up opportunities, and if 
the state interests affected are shared widely and similarly by most states, we should expect the 
effectiveness of the “political safeguards” of state lobbying and other influence to be at its nadir.  
Many of these factors, of course, occur with great frequency in the federal regulation of state 
taxing authority. 
Competition for revenues, a factor not mentioned elsewhere in the literature, also 
warrants some attention.  Other commentators have often assumed that overlapping taxing 
authority shared by two sovereigns leads to crowding out: citizens are willing to tolerate only so 
much taxation, and so higher taxes by one government are said to put pressure on the other to 
reduce its own revenues.  (E.g., Baker 1995).  Brennan and Buchanan (1984) go so far as to 
argue that a shared tax base is a common pool that overlapping sovereigns race to fish from.  
This competition theory is at least as old as Hamilton, who discussed it in the federalist papers, 
and Madison, who thought that vertical competition between the States and the federal 
government would restrain the size of both.  And normatively, overlapping tax bases are 
arguably inefficient to the extent that they increase the total marginal rate facing economic 
actors, and therefore increase the deadweight loss of taxation, an effect that is likely an 
externality for each of the overlapping levels.  (Hanson & Stuart 1987). 
It is not clear that crowd-out in fact happens, or that it is normatively undesirable, but it is 
certainly a piece of conventional wisdom.  Overlap also has benefits, such as reduced compliance 
costs for citizens and the opportunity for economies of scale and scope for governments.  (Galle 
2007b).  Descriptively, recent evidence suggests citizens may not consider one level of tax when 
making political decisions about the other.  (McCaffrey & Barron 2006).  Nonetheless, courts 
and politicians have long assumed that taxation at one level threatened the ability of the other 
sovereign to tax the same base.  For example, crowd-out was the Supreme Court’s asserted basis 
for constitutional limits on state taxing power in the mid-19th Century, and was the main 
rationale offered by Congress in 1963 for the federal income-tax deduction for state and local 
taxes paid.  
In any event, to the extent that Congress believes that crowd-out is a possibility, and is 
motivated by budgetary pressures, we should expect that Congress is not a fully trustworthy 
custodian of state taxing power.  Just as Congress may use its preemption power to monopolize 
opportunities for political rents, so too might it use the Commerce power to control the tax base.   
As a result, we expect that when Congress acts to alter state authority to tax, it will tend 
to reduce that power rather than expand it.  We expect that to be particularly true in the instance 
where the tax at issue falls on a narrow interest, while the budget burden of repeal would fall 
equally on most or all state budgets.  If our predictions are incorrect, though, that finding would 
strengthen considerably the argument of those who claim that the political safeguards of 
federalism are sturdy in all contexts.  
III.  Methodology 
 In order to test these hypotheses, we compiled a dataset consisting of every statute 
enacted by the U.S. Congress affecting state taxing power.  We then coded each statute for a 
variety of factors relating to our hypotheses, and conducted regression analysis to test our 
theories.6 
 The dataset was drawn from a keyword search on HeinOnline’s “U.S. Statutes at Large” 
database.7  We found HeinOnline’s search function to be a somewhat unreliable, returning 
slightly different results at different times with identical searches.  However, at the time of our 
writing HeinOnline is the only searchable database of year-by-year statutory text extending back 
to the 19th Century.  We ran our search repeatedly and cross-checked the results against one 
another to be certain we had found every statute.   
Next, we attempted to identify for each statute a prior authority affecting the same form 
of state tax, such as an earlier statute or Supreme Court decision.  This was important to our 
study for two reasons.  First, we were interested primarily in how Congress changed what the 
states could do, because the direction of change offers better evidence about how Congress 
behaves.  For example, if Congress enacts a statute that leaves state taxing power heavily 
constricted, but the law in place before was even stricter, we think that represents a victory for 
states, and vice-versa.  Thus coding only the end result, and not the change from baseline, could 
produce misleading results.  Second, and relatedly, the extent of pre-existing restrictions at the 
time of enactment is potentially important for our hypothesis-testing; we have to control for the 
possibility that existing law might influence states’ ability to affect federal legislation.   
                                                 
6 A Statutory Appendix with a complete listing of statutes, prior authorities, and scores is available from the author 
upon request. 
7 Our search was “tax* state*” ~15 OR “tariff* state*” ~15 OR “levy state*” ~15 OR “impost* state*” ~15 OR 
“excise* state*” ~15 NOT treaty.  We returned 976 hits, of which 116 proved to be related to state taxing power.   
We then coded both the statutes and the corresponding prior authorities.  We coded 
statutes for both their absolute and relative-to-baseline constraints on state power, while the prior 
authorities were coded only for absolute scores.  Both categories were coded on a scale of one to 
seven.  For the absolute score, a “one” represented a complete prohibition on a major source of 
state revenues, while a “seven” was no restrictions.  For relative scores, a “four” was no change 
relative to baseline, while “one” was a severe narrowing and “seven” was major expansion of the 
States’ authority.  We employed three research assistants to assist us with coding, and 
independently coded each statute and authority ourselves without looking at the assistants’ 
scores; where opinions ended up differing we used the average of the scores, weighting our own 
twice as heavily.   
Before proceeding with additional coding, we dropped from the dataset all statutes that 
lacked a prior authority, leaving us with 85 observations, nearly all from the 20th and 21st 
Centuries.  Our reasoning for dropping observations with no prior authority was that by default 
state taxing power (other than power to tax Indian tribes) is unlimited; therefore, in the absence 
of any prior reduction in state authority, the only direction for Congress to go would be down.  
That, of course, would have prevented us from drawing meaningful inferences from any finding 
that Congress tended to reduce state power.  So we instead confined our analysis to statutes in 
which Congress had an opportunity either to further constrain states or instead to undo the prior 
restraints.  Our decision to edit the data in this way does raise some interpretation questions of its 
own, as we will discuss further in Part V.   
Finally, we coded for additional aspects of our hypotheses we wished to test.  We created 
a dummy variable for each statute reflecting its fit with basic public-choice factors: if the state 
tax affected had burdened a relatively concentrated interest group, but its budget effects were 
shared widely within states and across states, we coded that statute a “1” in the public choice 
category.  We also added a dummy variable, called “rival,” which we coded “1” when the 
congressional enactment in question would also place another concentrated interest group at a 
competitive disadvantage.  For example, Public Law 86-272, which restricts state sales taxes on 
remote sales, was coded “1” in both categories, because it favored out-of-state distributors over 
local retailers.   
In an effort to tease apart the public-choice and base-competition hypotheses, we also 
compared statutes regulating state efforts to tax Indian tribes (and, before 1934, individual native 
Americans) with all others.  Congress does not and has never taxed the tribes directly, and 
arguably the Constitution prohibits them from doing so.  Until the 1930’s it was assumed that 
members of tribes, too, were exempt from federal tax, but the Treasury ruled otherwise and that 
ruling has apparently been followed ever since.  Thus, we expect that competition for the 
opportunity to tax the Indian tribes is considerably less intense than other forms of taxation.  
Accordingly, we created a dummy variable to indicate statutes affecting “Indians not taxed” by 
the federal government.  Where there was legal uncertainty whether Congress could tax the 
affected source of revenue, we coded the enactment “0,” on the view that this was the 
assumption most contrary to our hypothesis of differential treatment.  Of the 85 observations, 20 
of them were coded “1” for statutes affecting untaxed tribes.  
We test Levinson’s theory about the insensitivity of Congress to its own budget in several 
ways.  Our Indian variable sheds light indirectly on that question, since one possible explanation 
for more generous treatment of state laws affecting the tribes is that Congress is unconcerned 
with its own revenues in that instance.  A more direct measure we employ is to include the log of 
the number of members of the House of Representatives as an explanatory variable.8  Again, if 
members of Congress treat the budget as a common pool, a smaller pool should result in greater 
cost internalization.  And, finally, we include measures of slack or strain in the federal budget, 
such as annual debt or surplus as a percentage of GDP. 
<Descriptive Statistics> 
Our statistical analysis took several forms.  We performed a simple t-test to estimate the 
mean relative score within our restricted data set, and also performed that test separately for 
Indian and non-Indian statutes.  Due to the small number of Indian statutes, we could not 
perform a chi-square test to compare the two.  We did, however, include the Indian dummy 
variable in a series of regression analyses.   
Because OLS is unbiased for ordered rankings, we estimate results utilizing both OLS 
and an ordered probit.9  Several standard tests indicated heteroskedasticity was present as 
expected in our sample, so we also estimate OLS results using Huber-White standard errors.  A 
probit model assumes a normal underlying distribution; however, the literature advises against 
use of heteroskedasticity-corrected ordered probit in models with fewer than 100 observations 
(Keele & Park 2005).  Therefore we limit our use of the probit model to serving as a double-
check on the accuracy of the OLS regression.10   
We estimate a series of regressions using relative change in restrictions as the dependent 
variable.  To test several aspects of our hypothesis, described in more detail in the “Interpretation 
and Caveats” section, we constructed indicator variables for whether a given statute could 
plausibly be described as efficiency-enhancing under conventional micoeconomic analysis, and 
for whether it resolved coordination problems among the states.  We further control for year, 
                                                 
8 We do not report results for the number of Senators because of the small variation in that variable within our 
sample.  We do find significant results for Senate membership when we include it in our regressions, but those 
results appear to be driven almost entirely by three extreme outlier observations from the 19th Century.   
9 We also utilized an ordered logit, which (once adjusted for the expected differences in coefficients between a 
probit and logit model) resulted in similar predicted marginal results as the ordered probit.  As a result, we do not 
report the ordered logit findings.    
10 Unlike the ordered probit, OLS assumes that the “width” of the bins counted is uniform.  However, our “cut” 
point estimates in the ordered probit model are relatively evenly dispersed, except at the very top of our range where 
there are few observations.  This further supports our use of OLS.  
absolute score of prior authority, ideological composition of the two houses of Congress,11 and, 
where available, popular attitudes towards the federal government, federal taxation, and taxes in 
general.12  We measure congressional ideology using historical DW-nominate scores calculated 
by Carroll et al. (2011).13  We include measures for both the median position of the majority 
party as well as for Congress as a whole.   
IV.  Results 
Our results provide support for both the public-choice and tax-base competition 
hypotheses.  When Congress acts, it tends to reduce state taxing power, and this effect is more 
pronounced where there is tax-base competition and where public choice theory predicts. 
Even a casual inspection of the data suggests significant support for the base competition 
theory.  We find that the mean change in restrictions is in the more restrictive direction for non-
Indian statutes, and is in the less-restrictive direction for Indian statutes.  A t-test indicates that 
the mean relative score for non-Indian statutes is 3.51, with a 95% confidence interval of 3.23 to 
3.79 --- statistically significantly different from the null hypothesis of 4, no change.  The mean 
relative score for Indian statutes is 4.70, with a 95% confidence interval from 4.39 to 5.00 --- 
again, significantly differing from 4.   
<Fig. 1>      <Fig. 2> 
 
Turning to our regression analysis, we find strong support for our public-choice 
hypothesis in the form of a large negative coefficient for the public choice factors variable, as 
reported in Table 1 below.  In other words, when Congress alters state taxing power, if the state 
tax falls on a concentrated interest group (while providing undifferentiated revenue benefits to 
the whole population of the state), Congress is considerably more likely to limit that tax.  This 
finding was statistically significant at the 1% level.  We also find that adding a dummy variable 
to control for the presence of a concentrated opposition group increases the impact of the public 
choice variable.  That, too, is consistent with our hypothesis that unopposed interest groups have 
greater power to extract state-tax reductions from the federal government; when we failed to 
control for opposition, the measured influence of unopposed interest groups was biased 
downwards.    
                                                 
11 Because prior literature suggests that Democrats have a lower propensity to vote for “states’ rights” legislation  
(Hero 1989, Weissert & Schram 1996), we also employed measures of the percentage of democrats in the House and 
Senate.  Neither measure was significant and we do not report those results. 
12 These latter controls were available only from the 1970’s on, and because they proved insignificant, we do not 
report them. 
13 DW-Nominate provides estimates of two different forms of congressional ideology.  The first dimension “can be 
interpreted in most periods as government intervention in the economy.”  (Carroll et al. 2011).  The second reflects 
views on civil rights and race relations.  For discussion of how DW-Nominate is computed, see Carroll et al. 2008. 
  
 
Table 1: Determinants of Relative Change in Restrictiveness 
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Coefficients reported together with (standard error).  OLS regressions with Huber-White standard errors.   
Ordered probit results reported using predicted marginal effects at sample means.  * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
Additionally, when we control for other factors we continue to find that whether a statute 
affects Indian tribes has a highly significant positive effect on the relative score.  As reported in 
table 1, statutes affecting Indian tribes on average have considerably higher relative scores than 
others.  Although the confidence intervals are fairly wide, we find a P value of less than .01 in 
both models: that is, a less than one percent chance that this effect would have a positive sign 
purely by chance.14  Subject to some caveats, as we discuss below, we interpret this finding as 
evidence in support of both the base-competition hypothesis as well as the notion that Congress 
is sensitive to budget pressure. 
Our other efforts to evaluate the base-competition hypothesis were less successful.  We 
find that measures of Congress’ need for funds, such as annual deficit, have the predicted 
negative sign (that is, we find that larger deficits result in greater state restrictions) but are not 
statistically significant.  It may be that our measures are poor proxies for Congressional need for 
funds, or that we lack enough observations to use those measures meaningfully.  Alternately, it 
may simply be that Congress’ need for funds is not an important driver of its state-tax policy.   
We do, however, find additional evidence bearing on the budget-pressure question.  We 
find that Congress is less restrictive of state authority as the size of the House increases.  Again, 
we suggested that if Levinson (2005) is correct that members of Congress treat the budget as a 
commons, then we should expect to see greater restrictions on competing state revenue sources 
when the legislative chamber expands and each member internalizes a smaller fraction of each 
budget-related decision.  Our results are consistent with that story.  The fact that we find 
variation, though, suggests that Levinson overstates his case: the commons problem diminishes 
legislative sensitivity to budget pressure, but this effect varies with chamber size rather than 
being stuck at a uniform zero sensitivity.  And, again, our base-competition result implies that 
Congress does appear to care about its revenue stream.  
Additionally, we find the expected results for our political controls.  The ideology of the 
dominant party affects to a statistically significant degree decisions to curtail state autonomy, 
especially ideological views on “states’ rights” related race questions.15  The ideology of the 
minority party---represented in our data by the chamber median16---points in the opposite 
direction of the majority party, and the impact of this effect is more pronounced in the Senate.   
Finally, we find some evidence that time matters.  There is a fairly straight negative 
linear relation between relative score and year, at least for the period 1900 to present, although 
                                                 
14 Reported coefficients for the ordered probit model represent post-estimation predicted marginal effects at sample 
means, and hence can be compared directly to the OLS coefficients. 
15 The coefficients on these variables may look implausibly large, but it should be kept in mind that DW-Nominate 
is constrained to fall within -1 and 1.  Thus, the marginal effects of a one-unit move represent the impact of a move 
from a chamber mirroring the views of the median legislator to one that follows the views of the most extreme 
legislator possible on that issue.   
16 When the controlling party and chamber median positions are included together as explanatory variables, the 
coefficient of each represents the effects of that variable holding the other constant.   
this result is only marginally significant in the OLS model and not significant at all in the 
ordered probit.    
V.  Interpretation and Caveats 
 Overall, these findings suggest that political self-interest plays a role in Congress’ 
regulation of the States’ power to tax.  When states seek to tax Indian tribes, who are not sources 
of revenue for Congress, Congress is considerably more forgiving.  And unopposed interest 
groups fare rather better than others in winning congressional protection, implying that state 
lobbying can be overcome by interest-group pressure.  Indeed, when Congress acts with regard 
to state tax power, the mean result is a moderate reduction in that power.   
 One potential concern with these findings is that they could be artifacts of the research 
design.  For example, it might be argued that we find a negative trend in the relative score 
variable simply because Congress is acting against a baseline of no or few restrictions, leaving 
more room in the downward direction.   
 We think this is only a minor concern, for several reasons.  For one, as noted we 
restricted the sample to statutes for which there was a pre-existing restriction--- that is, where the 
absolute score of the prior authority was less than seven.  By definition, then, every observation 
in the dataset offered Congress at least some opportunity to relax restrictions as well as to tighten 
them.17  We also control for the absolute score of the prior authority in the reported results; 
adding this control reduced somewhat the impact of the Indian dummy but did not otherwise 
affect our results.  Thus, the restrictiveness of the prior restraint was not a significant predictor of 
Congress’ subsequent behavior.  Further, we note that most observed reductions in state 
authority were by a relatively small amount, implying that even for statutes with relatively 
unrestrictive prior authorities there was at least equal room for an equivalent move in the other 
direction.   
 Of course, by limiting the dataset to instances where a prior authority, usually the 
Supreme Court, had already found it necessary to rein in states, we may have introduced a 
selection bias.  Of greatest concern is the possibility that our results support the alternative 
hypothesis that Congress is maximizing national welfare by prohibiting inefficient state taxation.  
Arguably, subjects of taxation already restricted by the Supreme Court are more likely to be 
inefficient than others.  On the other hand, it could be argued that rules already policed by the 
Court would need no further oversight by Congress.18  In any event, to account for the possibility 
                                                 
17 There were no observations in our sample with a prior authority absolute score of 1, either. 
18 Yet another possible reason to expect correlation between Supreme Court decisions and later congressional action 
is that both are essentially driven by interest groups, who provide resources both for litigation leading to judicial 
resolution as well as the ensuing legislation.  See Collins (2007), Staudt et al. (2007).  This alternative, though, 
actually supports our hypothesis that interest-group influence drives commerce-clause outcomes.  
of selection bias, we also coded each enactment for efficiency, a dummy variable.19  We find that 
efficiency, if anything, is correlated with fewer restrictions on state authority.20  Including 
efficiency as an explanatory variable changes slightly the coefficients of the other variables but 
does not affect their sign.  Additionally, we find no statistically significant difference in the 
absolute scores of observations within the restricted dataset and those in the dataset as a whole.   
 Another form of selection bias that we indisputably face is that we can observe only 
legislation that actually passed.  It is possible that states routinely defeat much larger threats to 
their taxing power than those we observe, or that defeated proposals otherwise differ 
systematically from those in our dataset.  Thus, our results are best characterized as describing 
the common features of enacted legislation, rather than of the legislative process as a whole.  
Accordingly, we cannot say that political safeguards of federalism are never effective; for all we 
know, they may well be effective 99% of the time.  What we can say is that they are likely not 
100% effective, and that the observed instances of failure match well with theoretical predictions 
of failure.21  
 Of course, there is already substantial qualitative evidence that Congress at times 
diminishes state autonomy, such as through preemption, cross-cutting conditions on federal 
grants, and outright commands to states.  (NCSL 2004).  In many cases, though, what may 
appear to be a restriction on state autonomy in fact maximizes state well-being overall, just as 
constraints on individual liberty (such as prohibitions on theft and assault) may increase personal 
freedom on net.  As is well known, federal action can be a mechanism for resolving coordination 
or other collective-action problems states might otherwise face.  (Oates 1999, Cooter 2002). 
Congress, for example, may be a low-transaction-cost venue for coasian bargaining between 
                                                 
19 Since all tax reduction is efficient in the sense that it reduces deadweight loss, we coded a statute as efficient if its 
enactment could arguably cure some inefficiency other than the excess burden of taxation.  In some cases we 
balanced pro-efficiency gains against inefficiency losses.  Admittedly, some of these scores could be disputed.  For 
example, the internet tax freedom act bars states from forcing internet service providers to collect sales and use 
taxes.  Arguably this is efficient in the sense that ISP’s may generate network externalities, and so subsidies for the 
industry may be warranted under classic public-finance theory.  But at the same time this rule results in large 
geographical distortions, since it permits retailers to escape tax if they have no physical presence in a taxing 
jurisdiction.  It also distorts the flow of capital between remote and “brick and mortar” businesses.  And government 
could avoid these distortions, but subsidize the industry just as effectively, by using direct cash payments.  So we 
coded the ITFA as inefficient.      
20 It appears this correlation is driven mostly by federal immunity.  We coded judicial protection of federal 
contractors and property from state taxation as an inefficient distortion of capital flows towards the tax-favored 
firms, so that when Congress waived these protections, the result was efficiency-enhancing.   
21 We say that it is only “likely” that states are not 100% effective in their lobbying efforts, notwithstanding our 
results here, because we cannot rule out the alternative that states themselves were the impetus for federal legislation 
reducing their own taxing power.  That seems at best a minor possibility to us, though, since any story along those 
lines seems rather strained.  It might be argued, for instance, that states whose neighboring, rival state drew large 
revenues from a particular source, such as oil, might lobby the federal government to cut off that source of 
comparative advantage.  Or states that are the subject to significant tax-exporting might seek to close off the 
exporting at its source.  (Rose-Ackerman 1981).  But neither story fits particularly well with any of the statutes in 
our dataset.  It may be that some states have industries that could benefit from favorable tax treatment, but that is 
essentially the public choice story, not one of state influence.        
those states that create and those that are affected by externalities.  (Kobayashi & Ribstein 2007).  
The existing literature studying federal impositions on states does not clearly distinguish between 
these two forms of federal enactment.  Thus, the extant literature is unclear on whether federal 
authority actually reduces state autonomy.   
 We advance significantly over the prior, qualitative, literature by controlling for the 
possibility that federal legislation may be state autonomy-enhancing.  As noted, we find no 
correlation between the efficiency of a statute and the direction of change in state power.  
Additionally, we created another dummy variable, which we termed “coordination,” to identify 
federal statutes that arguably could be said to resolve some sort of state-level coordination or 
other collective-action problem (such as a race to the bottom).22  We found, however, that there 
was no correlation between whether a statute solved coordination problems and the direction of 
change in state authority: the relation between the two was essentially random, and including the 
coordination variable in the regression analyses did not meaningfully change the coefficient for 
any other variable.  Of course, this does not prove that coordination is not motivating Congress, 
but the fact that our evidence shows strong support for a public-choice story and no support for a 
coordination story is suggestive.       
 Our inability to observe failed legislation is less significant for the purely tax-related 
aspects of our hypotheses.  As noted, the contention in the literature is that Congress will 
outperform courts in safeguarding national well-being against state-level externalities.  In order 
for Congress to carry out that function, it must act (or at least threaten credibly to act).  Thus, in 
testing claims about how Congress performs when it is able to overcome legislative inertia, it 
makes sense to focus narrowly on Congress’ actual output.  Admittedly, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that even more forceful judicial efforts to prod Congress might result in passage of 
more benevolent laws than in the past.  But we do note that the Supreme Court has already 
employed what look to be significant penalty defaults in an effort to force congressional action, 
without any effect measurable in our data or otherwise.  (See Galle 2007 for more discussion).   
 Moving beyond selection bias concerns, we must acknowledge that there are alternative 
interpretations for the influence of the Indian variable.  Most significantly, it may be that the 
reason states have a freer hand to tax Indian tribes is because the tribes are politically weaker 
than other interest groups affected in our data set.  Scholars of U.S.-tribal relations argue that 
states used tax law, and especially the power to seize the property of tax debtors, as a tool for 
pillaging tribal property.  (Taylor 2008).  If this were the story, we might perhaps expect a trend 
towards parity in the modern era as outright oppression faded.  We do not, however, observe a 
                                                 
22 For instance, we coded as “1” federal enactments that established one and only one state to be the exclusive 
income-taxing jurisdiction for employees of the railroad, bus, air, and shipping industries.  These statutes are not 
necessarily efficient, in that they tend to distort the choice of state residence.  The cumulative burdens of compliance 
and auditing costs for each state, though, are largely an externality for each state (Shaviro 1992), suggesting that in 
the absence of coordination workers subject to tax in many states might be forced to comply with a confusing array 
of regimes. 
significant difference in the time trends between statutes affecting the tribes and others.    
Another factor that supports our explanation over this alternative is that, for the alternative to be 
true, it would have to be the case that Indian tribes are even less effective than the general public 
at lobbying.  But we find to the contrary that the mean relative score for Indian statutes does not 
differ significantly from the mean for non-Indian, non-public choice statutes; Congress treats 
Indians roughly the same as the public at large.    
Another aspect of the data worth some comment is the frequency with which Congress 
appears to enact legislation that does not change existing law.  Given the difficulty of enacting 
legislation, that is somewhat puzzling.  Staudt et al. (2007) offer several explanations, such as the 
possibility that legislation expands a judicial decision to new contexts (which we do not observe 
in our data) or clarifies a confusing precedent.  We further hypothesize that clear notice to the 
public is valuable in its own right, especially in eras that lack easy access to judicial decisions or 
computerized searches.  We continue to observe in our data simple codification in modern 
statutes, however, which inclines us towards other explanations.  Codification locks in outcomes 
against possible changes in judicial personnel, and may also, as Staudt et al. (2007) hint at, 
allows for rent-extraction from constituencies who are relatively unsophisticated about current 
law.  Thus, we think the extensive codification efforts we see in the data here provide some 
additional evidence of rent-seeking behavior by Congress.   
 One final riddle is how to interpret the linear, albeit only barely significant, negative 
relationship between year and relative score.  Percentages of national government expenditures 
spent at the state level, as well as attitudes towards federal taxes (Kincaid & Cole 2007, Kincaid 
& Cole 2000), exhibit a similar overall negative trend, while measures of overall policy 
centralization (Bowman & Krause 2003) show no correlation with our result.   Another 
possible explanation could be a learning story, in which special interests have over time 
developed expertise in influencing Congress, or members of Congress have become more aware 
of the potential for rent-extraction through tax legislation.  (Posner 2005).  We found no 
significant results with any interaction terms between the year, public choice, and rival variables.  
Still, this might simply represent the limitations of our data.  
VI. Conclusion 
 While our evidence here certainly does not end any debates over federalism, it is 
suggestive.  Claims that states never need to fear inefficient federal expansions seem likely to be 
overstated.  We find that, at least in the case where special interest influence is strong, and 
Congress can export the costs of regulation to the States, congressional action in fact does tend to 
diminish state prerogatives.  Further, we find no evidence that this diminution might be serving 
to preserve state autonomy in the long run by facilitating coordination among states.     
 We therefore provide at least modest support for a continuing judicial role in federalism 
decisions.  To be sure, the possibility of occasional bad deeds by Congress is not the only factor 
in play.  Unfunded mandates might still be justified as efficient allocation of the social costs of 
regulation (Dana 1995, Adler 1997, Roin 1999), or shrugged off as simply another opportunity 
for states to hold up the federal government within a cooperative regime (Caminker 1995, Siegel 
2006, Bulman-Pozen & Gerken 2009).  And courts may simply be so bad at federalism decisions 
that even a Congress that can at times be captured by special interests looks good by comparison.  
In some areas, however, such as the dormant commerce clause, commentary to date has assumed 
uncritically that Congress is both the superior fact-finder and also a trustworthy maximizer of 
national welfare.  At a minimum, our findings here warrant consideration of how to balance the 
strengths and weaknesses of the three branches in regulating free trade, a project we take up 
elsewhere. 
 In addition, our findings shed some light on the motivations of Congress.  Levinson 
(2005) argues that members of Congress are at best only weakly motivated by the size of the 
federal budget, since the effect of any one actor on the budget as a whole is largely an externality 
for individual members.  We find, in contrast, that opportunities for reducing budget pressure do 
seem to play a role at least in statutes affecting state tax policy.  Internal institutional factors, 
such as party leadership and budget rules, may outweigh the collective action problems members 
would otherwise face, a possibility that merits further investigation. 
 Lastly, it is worth emphasizing the institutional dimension of our findings.  We study here 
only Congress and, indirectly, the President as veto player.  We have argued elsewhere that 
administrative agencies are relatively more likely to take care with state autonomy, at least in the 
case where judicial review demands that they do so.  (Galle & Seidenfeld 2008).  Our findings 
therefore suggest the possible appeal of a federalism doctrine that shifts more authority to 
agencies, although more empirical work into the performance of the executive is needed to 
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 Descriptive Statistics 
~~~~~~~ 
 
Variable  Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
 
Public Choice  85 .4705882 .5020964 0  1 
Indian   85 .2588235 .4405878 0  1 
year   85 1960.882 33.70545 1864  2007 
efficient?  85 .2705882 .4469003 0  1 
coordination?  85 .2823529 .4528157 0  1 
rival   85 .2941176 .4583492 0  1 
absolute score  85 4.423529 1.257136 2  7 
relative score  85 3.835294 1.213486 1  6 
prior authority score 85 4.364706 1.502752 2  7 
surplus per gdp 85 -2.391176 3.891649 -22.7  2.4 
house members 85 427.1765 34.61701 184  437 
percent dem house 85 .5566555 .0948279 .3011494 .7402299 
senate seats  85 97.24706 6.502574 52  100 
percent dem senate 85 .5439583 .1022101 .1923077 .7395833 
house med dim. 1 85 .0224471 .1798338 -.255  .414 
house med dim. 2 85 .0111529 .0885928 -.135  .23 
h maj party med 1 85 -.0226824 .3523874 -.388  .526 
h maj party med 2 85 .1227882 .1792056 -.369  .53 
sen med dim. 1 85 -.0336941 .1290925 -.301  .318 
sen med dim. 2 85 -.0389765 .1004343 -.303  .162 
sen maj party med 1 85 -.0097765 .3301069 -.502  .459 
sen maj party med 2 85 .0287882 .2503121 -.462  .33 
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Fig. 1: Observations by 
Relative Score (All Statutes)
count









Fig. 2: Observations by 
Relative Score 
(Non-Indian Statutes)
Count
